

VZCZCXRO1431
OO RUEH DU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0757 2420830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290830Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3357
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2245
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2365
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0895
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1642
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1998
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2419
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4851
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1514
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000757

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR G. GARLAND
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [PHUM](#) [ZI](#)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SIMBA MAKONI

REF: HARARE 747

Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on August 28, Simba Makoni gave his analysis of the current political situation. While Makoni acknowledged that he is not now a political player, as someone who has been involved in Zimbabwean politics and government over the years, his views are worth noting.

¶2. (C) After MDC Tsvangirai (MDC-T) triumphed in Monday's election for House of Assembly speaker, Makoni said there was "less and less" of a chance of a deal between ZANU-PF and MDC-T. Morgan Tsvangirai had demonstrated his strength and would dig in his heels. Although difficult to predict, Makoni did not see an early end to Zimbabwe's crisis.

¶3. (C) With both Mugabe and Tsvangirai insisting on holding the lion's share of executive power, the Ambassador asked Makoni how a deal could be possible between their two parties. Makoni said it would be important for the U.S. to try to influence Mugabe's closest supporters--the military leaders and Emmerson Mnangagwa. He agreed with the Ambassador that contact with the Zimbabwean generals by a senior U.S. military leader could be productive if a way were found to arrange this.

¶4. (C) Makoni said there had been internal opposition to Mugabe from within ZANU-PF for over 10 years. This opposition was now at a peak. Nevertheless, Mugabe had been able to hold on to power through fear. Makoni saw no immediate threat to Mugabe, but noted that a potential coalition between the Mujuru faction and ex-ZAPU ZANU-PF members from Matabeleland could leave Mugabe without a working majority in the ZANU-PF Politburo and Central Committee. Makoni said Mugabe was aware of his problems and was seeking to intimidate and quiet his internal opposition. Illustrative of this was his recent appointment of governors; he replaced four governors thought to be allied to Solomon Mujuru.

¶5. (C) On the subject of the MDC, Makoni said Tsvangirai continued to make the mistake of operating regionally and internationally, rather than consolidating his support in Zimbabwe. He noted that after the March elections, Tsvangirai almost immediately left Zimbabwe rather than working to marshal support within the country. More recently, after the SADC Summit in South Africa, Tsvangirai traveled in the region rather than returning to Zimbabwe to explain why he had not signed an agreement with Mugabe. Makoni recommended that Tsvangirai make Zimbabwe his priority, then the region, then the wider international community.

¶6. (C) As we have suggested (reftel), Makoni said that within Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai, as the principal opposition leader, needed to do a much better job of reaching out to civil society and non-MDC leaders such as himself. Makoni pledged he and others would willingly work with Tsvangirai, but Tsvangirai had to indicate his interest in being inclusive.

MC GEE